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Psychology and History volume 
Chapter outline by Mark Knights, University of Warwick 
 
Mark Knights is Professor of History at the University of Warwick. He is the author (amongst 
other works) of Representation and Misrepresentation in Later Stuart Britain: Partisanship 
and Political Culture (OUP, 2005) and The Devil in Disguise (OUP, 2011), both of which 
consider partisan publics and the construction of stereotypes in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries. 
 
Historical stereotypes and histories of stereotypes 
History and social psychology share interests in the public sphere, the arts of persuasion and 
the formation of attitudes. As a result, both disciplines are interested in the construction, 
manipulation, dissemination and evolution of stereotypes and the prejudices on which they 
feed. The first section of this chapter outlines themes, conclusions and approaches drawn 
from psychology that might be particularly useful for historical analysis. Much of the social 
psychology literature about stereotyping should be of significant interest to historians, even 
though, it seems, it is seldom used by them. I shall then examine historical approaches to 
stereotyping and highlight some of the benefits of using historical data, which, in turn, is 
strikingly absent from most of the published social psychology work in the field. At one time 
the social sciences and history drew frequently on one another; now, that relationship, at least 
so far as psychology is concerned, seems more distant, though there are good reasons for 
thinking that some sort of rapprochement may be taking place and this chapter seeks to foster 
that process.1 The final section of the chapter will take a case study, the stereotypes of reform 
and reformers in eighteenth and early nineteenth century Britain, in order to bring the two 
approaches together, and also to show how an even broader inter-disciplinary approach, 
integrating visual and linguistic concerns, might be a productive way forward. 
I 
Social pyschologists seem agreed that stereotyping is a by-product of normal cognitive 
processes that help us to order, simplify and hence better understand the complex world 
around us.2 A stereotype is thus simply an association of attributes with a certain group of 
                                                          
1 ‘Bridging History and Social Psychology’, Special Issue of Integrative Psychological and 
Behavioral Science ed Vlad Glăveanu, Koji Yamamoto Volume 46, Issue 4, December 2012. 
See also note 4. 
2 A helpful overview can be found in Charles Stangor and Mark Schaller, ‘Stereotypes as 
Individual and Collective Representations’, in C. Neil Macrae, Charles Stangor, Miles 
Hewstone (eds.) Stereotypes and Stereotyping (Guilford Press, 1996). David Schneider, The 
Psychology of Stereotyping, chapter 8  (Guilford Press, New York, 2005) offers another good 
starting point.  
people.3 The human mind has to think with the help of categorisations which form part of an 
orderly mental outlook. All this has the advantage, for the historian, of considering 
stereotypes as a normal and ubiquitous mental processes rather than as something necessarily 
the product of a corrupted or distorted mind, and hence helps to make stereotypes ‘rational’ 
rather than ‘irrational’ phenomena, even when they are highly emotionally charged. Such an 
approach also makes it imperative to consider stereotypes historically: if they are part of the 
way in which the human mind works, they are as much a part of the past as the present. Yet 
this raises a further question, worth investigating in itself, about whether cognitive process in 
the modern era are the same as those of the pre-modern era or whether cognition is culturally 
constructed or at least influenced by the contemporary world. My assumption in what follows 
is that modern and pre-modern minds share enough similarities for recent research to have a 
bearing on how we understand the pre-modern mind. Although the culture of the past 
certainly shaped and perhaps even determined what people thought and (as recent work on 
the history of emotions suggests) felt, as well as how they behaved, I make the assumption 
that certain behavioural responses and cognitive functions relating to how information is 
processed by the brain remain the same or similar, sufficiently so for modern findings to have 
some relevance for the past or at least to raise interesting questions for the historian; but I 
freely admit that this is an untested and possibly controversial position that would benefit 
further exploration.4  
Broadly speaking there are two different, but not necessarily incompatible, approaches to 
understanding stereotype formation: one examines the individual cognitive processes 
occurring in the individual, the other stresses the cultural and contextual factors that make for 
collective or shared, social representations. The former stresses the way in which the mind 
works whereas the latter highlights the influential role played by parents, teachers, political 
and religious leaders and, above all, the media and advertisements. This second approach, 
with its stress on cultural factors, might seem the more likely fit with cultural history; but the 
                                                          
3 A stereotype can, but need not necessarily, become a prejudice (an emotive pre-judgement) 
and lead to active discrimination. The relationship between stereotypes, prejudices and 
discrimination is explored in David Schneider, The Psychology of Stereotyping, chapter 8  
(Guilford Press, New York, 2005); Charles Stangor (ed.), Stereotypes and Prejudice: 
Essential Readings (Psychology Press, 2000). The relationship between prejudice and 
categorical thinking was first systematically explored by Gordon Allport, The Nature of 
Prejudice (1954) 
4 William M Reddy, The Navigation of Feeling: A Framework for the History of Emotions 
(Cambridge: 2001); Thomas Dixon, From Passions to Emotions: the Creation of a Secular 
Psychological Category (Cambridge 2003); Barbara Rosenwein, 'Worrying about Emotions in 
History', American Historical Review, 107 (2002), 921-45; Rosenwein, ‘Problems and 
Methods in the History of Emotions’, in Passions in Context: International Journal for the 
History and Theory of Emotions, 1 (2010), pp.1-11; A History of Emotions, 1200–1800 ed 
Jonas Liliequist (2012). For a sceptical discussion about ‘transhistorical laws in social 
psychology’ urging the need to recognise change over time see K. Gergen, ‘Social Psychology 
as History’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 26 (2) 1973, 309-320. Nevertheless 
Gergen concludes (318) that although expressions of behaviour are primarily culturally 
determined, some behaviour may be fixed and that ‘we have yet to tap the vast quantities 
of information regarding interaction patterns in earlier periods’. 
 
cognitive reaction of individuals is also surely important and can have implications for the 
historian, particularly, I suggest in what follows, in helping to understand the process by 
which stereotypes are constructed and maintained.  
Indeed, despite the different schools there seems to be some common ground among social 
psychologists attempting to explain why stereotypes form. One common suggestion is that 
they strengthen the identity and esteem of ‘in-groups’, that is to say, groups with which an 
individual identifies.5 In-groups have an internal cohesion that is in part derived from the 
identification of an ‘out-group’ with which they are in competition or conflict or tension. 
Indeed, another interesting characteristic noted by psychologists is that the more a group is 
seen as a unity or entity, the greater readiness there is to stereotype it, even in small, face-to-
face groups where groups have a good deal of individualised information about each other 
(everyday interaction which other parts of the literature suggests might be expected to 
counteract the stereotype).6 When we see a group of people as an entity, we will often 
attribute something essential to it. That process is also recognisable from historical 
stereotypes. Moreover, the social psychology literature suggests that stereotypes are, to a 
surprising extent, self-fulfilling: the expectation that an individual will act in a stereotypical 
fashion influences how that individual actually behaves. The formation of a stereotype is thus 
in some ways cyclical and self-reinforcing.7 Again, such a process is historically observable. 
Confessions by witches, for example, show the degree to which the hostile stereotype was 
internalised and shaped behaviour.8 
Stereotypes are particularly common in times of crisis and stress, when the mind needs to 
impose order on a complex and challenging ‘information-rich environment’. ‘Research amply 
demonstrates that the use of social stereotypes increases in cognitively demanding situations 
…Needs to simplify and structure understanding may be heightened within societies during 
times of crisis, such as wars, economic recessions and natural disasters’.9 These conclusions 
are particularly suggestive to the historian, since it was very often such periods of crisis in 
which the authority and identity of groups was contested, challenged and often vulnerable, 
requiring more frequent assertion and greater reinforcement, producing literatures rich in 
stereotypical observations.  
                                                          
5 For an overview see Schneider, The Psychology of Stereotyping, chapter 7.  
6 Rupert Brown, Prejudice: its social Psychology (2010), pp. 77-8.  
7 For an overview of this literature see Schneider, The Pyschology of Stereotyping, pp.215-24. 
8 For witchcraft see Malcolm Gaskill, ‘Witchcraft in early modern Ken: stereotypes and the 
background to accusations’, in Jonathan Barry, Marianne Hester and Gareth Roberts (eds), 
Witchcraft in Early Modern Europe: Studies in Culture and Belief (Cambrdige, 1998); Jim 
Sharpe, Instruments of Darkness: Witchcraft in Early Modern England (1997); Robin Briggs, 
Witches and Neighbours: The Social and Cultural Context of European Witchcraft (2nd edn. 
2002); Clark (ed), Languages of Witchcraft: Narrative, ideology and meaning in Early 
Modern Culture (2001). 
9 Stangor and Schaller, ‘Stereotypes as Individual and Collective Representations’, pp. 21-2. 
Although the terms are rather old-fashioned in the social psychology literature, the notions of 
schema and prototypes might also be useful to historians.10 Schemas ‘are abstract knowledge 
structures that specify the defining features and relevant attributes of a given concept’ and 
since the historian often investigates concepts in the past, a means of thinking about concepts 
is particularly useful. Akin to the schema is the prototype, an ‘averaged idea of the concept’, 
a typical representation of it - again, something very familiar to the historian, as will be 
shown in the third part of this chapter.  
The psychology literature also offers interesting suggestions about how stereotypes are 
maintained. One approach that straddles both the individual and cultural schools of social 
psychology is rooted in language. It has been noted that some pairings of words are much 
stronger than others and hence better remembered. Such strong or ‘hot’ associations help to 
form stereotypical associations.11 Examining which words are associated with others thus 
helps us to understand how stereotypes are constructed and the emotive power they wield. 
The ‘hot’ associations may also help to explain why stereotypes are so enduring, often 
persisting across several generations. It has also been suggested, by Abric and others, that a 
collective or social representation has a ‘central core’, that is fundamental to its character, 
with peripheral elements that are less important and which might change over time and 
context.12 The ideas expressed in the stable core also tend to be ‘hot’ words, closely related to 
emotional and bodily experience.  
Another interesting approach, led by Semin, Fiedler and Maass,has been to examine the 
language used to describe in-groups and out-groups.13 It was found that undesirable 
characteristics in the out-group tend to be described in abstract terms that describe states of 
being. Thus A hitting B might be summarised not as an observable one-off event but 
abstracted as a personality trait: ‘A is violent’. But desirable characteristics displayed by the 
out-group tended to be described in much more specific ways that could be explained away 
as single incidents or aberrations from normal expectations. Conversely, undesirable 
                                                          
10 For an overveiew see ibid, pp.7-9; Schneider, The Psychology of Stereotyping, chapter 4.  
11 D. L. Hamilton, P. M. Dugan, and T.K, Trolier, ‘The formation of stereotypic beliefs: 
Further evidence for distinctive-based illusory correlations’, Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology 58 (1985), 5-17; B. Mullen and C. Johnson, ‘Distinctiveness-based 
illusory correlations and stereotyping: a meta-analytical integration’, British Journal of Social 
Psychology 29 (1990), 11-28; Wolfgang Wagner, Jose Valencia and Fran Elejabarrieta, 
‘Relevance, discourse and the ‘hot’ stable core of social representations-A structural analysis 
of word associations’, British Journal of Social Psychology 35.3 (1996), 331-352 
12 J. C. Flament, and P Moliner, ‘Contribution expérimentale à la théorie du noyeau central 
d’une répresentation’ in J-L Beauvois, R-V Joule and J-M Monteil (eds.), Perspectives 
cognitive et conduites sociales (1989)l J.C Abric, ‘Central System, peripheral system: their 
functions and roles in the dynamics of social representations’, Papers on Social 
Representations 2 (1993), 75-8; Abric, ‘Les représentations sociales: aspects théoriques’ in 
Abric (ed.), Pratiques socials et représentations (Paris, 1994). 
13 For an overview see Schneider, Psychology of Stereotyping, pp. 553-9. 
behaviour in one’s own group tends to be described in very specific and hence limiting ways, 
with the more enduring abstractions being reserved for their desirable behaviour. Thus 
undesirable behaviour in one’s own group tends to be excused as idiosyncratic, while that in 
an out-group tends to be generalised as characteristic of the group as a whole. Indeed, Semin 
and Fiedler, building on work by Roger Brown, drew up four categories of verbs (the 
‘linguistic category model’) to describe the different ways in which language was being used, 
ranging from the abstract to the particular. The first two categories, ‘descriptive action verb’ 
and ‘interpretative action verb’, refer to specific events; the last two are more abstract: ‘state 
verb’ describes an emotional, affective or mental state, such as ‘love’, ‘admire’, ‘desire’, 
‘envy’ and the fourth category, ‘adjectives’, describes highly abstract character dispositions, 
such as ‘honest’, ‘impulsive’, ‘reliable’. Given that information at an abstract level is open-
ended and resistant to change, the prevalence of abstractions in stereotypes might help to 
explain their longevity as well as why behaviour that does not conform to a stereotype can be 
discounted as isolated and untypical.14  
Moving away from explanations rooted in cognitive psyschology a group of social 
psychologists - Jonathan Potter, Margaret Wetherell and Michael Billig prominent among 
them- also study discourse in order to emphasise how the phenomenon of categorisation and 
stereotyping is a social practice involving certain sorts of language use.15 As Potter and 
Wetherell put it, ‘discourse analysis focuses, above all, on quintessentially psychological 
activities - activities of justification, rationalisation, categorisation, attribution, making sense, 
naming, blaming and identifying. Discourse studies links those activities with collective 
forms of social action’ and uncovers ‘a discursive history’, a process that mixes 
‘representation and reality’.16 This comes close to the ‘linguistic turn’ taken by historians 
which has resulted in a heightened awareness of the power of language itself to shape 
                                                          
14 R. Brown and D. Fish, ‘The psychological causality implicit in language’, Cognition, 14 
(1983), 237-273; G. R Semin and K. Fiedler, ‘The linguistic category model, its bases, 
applications and range’ in W. Stroebe and M Hewstone (eds), European Review of Social 
Psychology vol. 2 pp.1-50; Semin and Fiedler, ‘The inferential properties of interpersonal 
verbs’ in Semin and Fiedler (eds), Language, Interaction and social cognition (1992); A. 
Maass, D. Salvi, L. Arcuri, and G Semin, ‘Language use in intergroup contexts: the linguistic 
intergroup bias’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 57 (1989), 981-993; Maass 
and Arcuri, ‘The role of language in the persistence of stereotypes; in G.R. Semin and K. 
Fiedler (eds.), Language, interaction and social cognition (1992) ; Maass, A. Milesi, S. 
Zabbini, and D.Stahlberg, ‘Linguistic inter-group bias: differential expectancies or in-group 
protection’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 68 (1995), 116-26.  
 
15 Jonathan Potter and Margaret Wetherell, Discourse and Social Psychology. Beyond 
Attitudes and Behaviour (London, 1987); Margaret Wetherell and Jonathan Potter, Mapping 
the Language of Racism. Discourse and the Legitimation of Exploitation (Hemel Hempstead, 
1992)  
16 Wetherell and Potter, Mapping the Language, pp.2, 4, 40. 
behaviour, to create modern identities and mindsets, and to subvert the distinction ‘between 
representation and reality’.17  
Further possibilities for a fruitful exchange between psychologists and historians around the 
issue of language are highlighted by Billig’s research which straddles both the pre-modern 
past and social psychology. His work on the importance of rhetoric as a way of thinking and 
arguing shows on the one hand the benefit to social psychologists of understanding how 
people in the pre-modern era were taught to think and speak. He shows how rhetoric’s stress 
on duality, dialogue and dialectic help to explain how thought is governed and shaped by 
cultural factors. There are, he shows, always opposing ways of categorising any situation, 
often involving the creation of sub-categories by splitting categories into parts 
(‘particularisation’) and prejudices are thus necessarily fluid, variable and adaptable.18 This 
work has implications for historians. Billig’s assertion that ‘all the major themes of modern 
social psychology can be found in classical rhetoric’ should alert historians to finding ways of 
drawing on that literature about persuasion, categorisation, and ways of thinking.19  
Indeed, this interest in language is where the historian (and literary historian) perhaps comes 
nearest to the psychologist. Rhetoric was learned by all educated people after the 
Renaissance.20 Teaching the techniques of speaking well and persuasively, rhetoric had much 
in common with stereotyping. It stressed the need to arouse emotion, even to the extent of 
moving, exciting and agitating the audience and some rhetorical manuals encouraged orators 
to whip up hatred by denigrating their opponents. The author of the Rhetorica Ad Herennium 
thus argued that it was justifiable to turn adversaries into objects of hatred ‘if we can pin on 
them such attributes as violence, lust for power, factiousness, excessive wealth, and 
promiscousness’.21 Moreover, rhetoric encouraged exaggeration and re-description, which 
could convert virtues into vices or insinuate that vice was being disguised under a veil of 
virtue. The rhetorician thus ‘uncovered’ the vice of an antagonist – rather in the way that a 
stereotype claims to reveal the truth or reality about a group or an individual representing a 
group. And in trying to arouse emotion, rhetoricians also sought to conjure up what Walter 
Lippmann, when coining the term stereotype in 1922, called ‘speaking pictures’, in the minds 
of their audience. These vivid mental pictures could use metaphor to make them even more 
                                                          
17 Patrick Joyce, Democratic Subjects: The Self and the Social in Nineteenth-Century 
England (Cambridge, 1994), p.2. For an overview see E. A. Clark, History, Theory, Text: 
Historians and the Linguistic Turn (Cambridge, Mass., 2004); Gareth Stedman Jones, 
Languages of Class: Studies in Working Class History 1832-1982 (Cambridge, 1984) 
18 M. Billig, ‘Prejudice, categorization and particularization: from a perceptual to a rhetorical 
approach’, European Journal of Social Psychology, Vol. 15, 79-103 (1985), pp. 98-9. 
19 M. Billig, Arguing and Thinking: a rhetorical approach to social psychology (2nd edn. 
1996), p. 84. 
20 For an overview see J. Richards, Rhetoric (2007). 
21 Quoted by Q. Skinner, Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes (Cambridge, 
1997), p.131 
striking, but it was also permissible to use ridicule and distortion. Rhetoric also encouraged 
thinking - or at least speaking - in terms of the binaries so familiar to students of stereotypes. 
Thomas Wilson’s Arte of Rhetorique argued that ‘by contraries set together, thynges 
oftentimes appere greater’.22 
 
For the historian, then, the psychological literature contains a number of fruitful conclusions. 
There is advantage in studying stereotypes as: products of everyday mental processes; 
interactions between individual cognition and cultural constructions; influenced by media 
representations; ways in which every individual and every society makes sense of the 
complexities around them; phenomena more likely to occur at times of tension, crisis, and 
conflict; means of bolstering an in-group over another; being remarkable persistent over time 
and yet, at the periphery, responding to change; based on entitative abstractions of group 
rather than individual behaviour and on shared schema and prototypes; drawing a good deal 
of emotive power from the associations of particular words or labels, and using language in 
very particular ways that reinforce stereotypical concepts. Many of these approaches have 
inherently historical implications or might be tested using historical data. Language, at least 
in it written form, can at least be recovered from the past and analysed. Historians can thus 
study the part played by language in the construction and maintenance of stereotypes. 
Nevertheless, the lack of a historical perspective in much of the social psychology literature 
is striking and Billig was self-consciously aware that his approach differed radically from that 
adopted by many of his colleagues, to the extent that he found himself ‘cut off from the wider 
academic world’ of social psychology.23 Perhaps because of its methodological reliance on 
experimenting with live subjects, almost the entire literature focuses on the present and 
ignores the data available from the past. Despite the recognition that stereotyping is a normal 
cognitive function, and hence must be common to mankind across time, there is an implicit 
assumption, seldom examined or even fully stated, that modern mass society has in some way 
been transformative, ruling out historical data as of relevance to modern conceptions. Of 
course, it is true that modern visual and virtual media is in some ways different to earlier print 
and manuscript means of communication, but the differences can easily be exaggerated and a 
good deal might be learned from studies of earlier stereotypical representations.  
 
The lack of a pre-modern historical perspective pervades not only the social psychology 
literature but also work done by sociologists and students of the media. For example, from a 
media studies perspective, Michael Pickering’s rather illuminating work draws on twentieth 
century history but goes no further back in time.24 The focus on the present and the very 
recent past may have something to do with the foundation of stereotyping as a concept: 
Lippmann was a political journalist trying to analyse the effects of modern mass media. Yet 
the lack of a historical perspective curtails some aspects of social psychology’s 
investigations. For example, one important element of stereotype studies has to do with how 
far and fast they can change over time (and hence also how negative prejudices can be 
overcome or diminished). David Schneider, for example, says that culture is important in the 
development of stereotypes ‘but its role is often indirect and hard to document’, a problem to 
                                                          
22 Wilson, The Arte of Rhetorique (1553), p.69; cf. Skinner, Reason and Rhetoric, p.413 
23 Ibid, pp. 6-7. 
24 M. Pickering, Stereotyping: the Politics of Representation (2001) 
which the historian is nevertheless accustomed and equipped with certain tools to deal with.25 
Similarly if stereotypes are not fixed but can either evolve or even be modified, as is now 
generally recognised in the literature, then they are inherently historical things that demand to 
be tracked over time.26 
 
II 
 
 
If much of the social psychology literature is curiously a-historical, the historical literature on 
stereotypes also makes little use of social psychology. The term ‘stereotype’ is quite often 
used by historians, yet is a concept that is seldom theorised; or, more generously, it has been 
theorised through engagement with other cognate disciplines such as literature, linguistics, 
sociology, political science and anthropology rather than psychology. What follows is an 
attempt to sketch some of the ways in which historians have thought about the process of 
stereotyping and the fields of study in which historical work on stereotypes has been 
conducted. My focus for the latter will be on my own area of expertise, pre-modern history, 
but I hope to raise methodological issues that extend beyond this period and hence have a 
wider application.  
 
There is now a considerable body of historical work that explores stereotypes in what is 
known as the ‘early modern’ period, from about 1500 to about 1800.27 Historians have 
charted their pervasive use in religious controversies that raged as a result of the Protestant 
reformation and the Catholics’ own reformation and counter-reformation. Some of the most 
interesting material in the British context relates to polemical constructs of the ‘hotter sort of 
protestants’ know as Puritans28 and the construction of prejudices against catholics - work to 
which we shall return shortly.29 At the same time, stereotypes of unorthodox belief, such as 
                                                          
25 Schneider, The Psychology of Stereotyping, p.23, 
26 For a discussion of how stereotypes change see ibid chapter 10. 
27 An extensive bibliography for the points made in this paragraph can be found in Mark 
Knights, ‘Taking a Historical Turn: Possible Points of Connection Between Social 
Pyschology and History’, Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science (2012). 
28 P. Collinson, ‘The Puritan Character: Polemics and Polarities in Early 
Seventeenth Century English Culture’ (1989), reprinted in Collinson, From Cranmer to 
Sancroft (London 2006); Collinson,’Ecclesiastical Vitriol; Religious Satire in the 1590s and 
the Invention of Puritanism‟ in John Guy (ed) The Reign of Elizabeth I (Cambridge, 1994); 
Haigh, ‘The character of an Anti-puritan’, The Sixteenth Century Journal 35.3 (2004); P. 
Lake, ‘Puritan Identitie’ in Journal of Ecclesiastical History 35 (1984), 112-23; Lake, ‘Anti-
Puritanism: The Structure of a Prejudice’ in K. Fincham and P. Lake (eds.), Religious Politics 
in Post-Reformation England: Essays in Honour of Nicholas Tyacke (Woodbridge, 2006) 
29  P. Lake, ‘Anti-Popery: the Structure of a Prejudice’, in R. Cust and A. Hughes (eds), 
Conflict in Early Stuart England (London 1989); A. Milton, ‘A Qualified Intolerance: the 
Limits and Ambiguities of Early Stuart Anti-Catholicism’, in A. Marotti (ed.), Catholicism 
and Anti-Catholicism in Early Modern EnglishTexts (Basingstoke 1999); A. Walsham, 
Church Papists: Catholicism, Conformity and Confessional Polemic in Early Modern 
England (Woodbridge, 1993). 
atheism and Judaism, have been studied, though most attention has focused on witchcraft 
which has provided a very rich supply of stereotypical material. Perhaps closer to the social 
psychology literature has been the work on race and gender. Stereotypes of women, 
homosexuals and blacks have been explored quite extensively, together with analysis of the 
poor and outcast. Work on the role of the printing press - the new technology of the pre-
modern period that was later to give the stereotype its name, after a process developed in the 
eighteenth century to fix type - also relates to the social sciences literature in exploring how 
the media helped to shape collective representations. Historical work on national identity, 
including the emergence and fostering of a sense of Britishness, and on partisan politics also 
offers insights into the construction of in and out groups. Finally, some of the literary and 
visual techniques associated with stereotyping have been explored through studies of rhetoric 
and satire, both verbal and visual.  
This work has both generated and borrowed from some interesting approaches, some of 
which have run in parallel with those of social psychology but amplify it in important ways. 
One influential concept has been the ‘imagined community’ described by that pioneered by 
an historically-minded political scientist, Benedict Anderson.30 Applying his idea to 
nationalism, Anderson suggests that the nation was itself an imagined construct made 
possible by historical conditions such as the growth of the press and the erosion of the 
ideology of divine right monarchy. An ‘imagined community’ was thus a cultural construct, 
historically determined in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, creating a 
prototype replicated elsewhere.  
Identity also proved a fertile concept for the literary critic Edward Said who, in his 
exploration of the prejudices against oriental culture, stressed the process of ‘Othering’ by 
which false images of Asian and Middle Eastern culture had been created against which 
Western identity was shaped. Western writings about the Orient depict it as an irrational, 
weak, feminised "Other", contrasted with the rational, strong, masculine West. Thus the 
stereotypes of the oriental helped to define both East and West, permeated all western 
attitudes and literature, and also in turn justified western imperialism.31 Both the ‘imagined 
community’ and the process of ‘Othering’ have been widely taken up in historical works, 
particularly (but by no means exclusively) by those concerned with issues of national 
identity.  
The binaries at work in Said’s approach were also the subject of historian Stuart Clarke’s 
approach to the study of witchcraft.32 Clarke analysed an early modern mindset that he 
argued was culturally predetermined to think in terms of opposites or ‘contrarieties’ and 
                                                          
30 B. Anderson, Imagined communities: reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism 
(1983) 
31 Edward Said, Orientalism (1978) 
32 S. Clark, ‘Inversion, Misrule and the Meaning of Witchcraft’, Past and Present, 87 (1980), 
98-127; Clark, Thinking with Demons: the idea of witchcraft in early modern Europe (1997) 
hence which readily and rationally accepted notions of divergent orthodox and unorthodox 
religious beliefs that were expressed in a persecuting prejudice against witches. The language 
of inversion, antithesis, and contrariety and the habit of binary thinking which permeated 
contemporary attitudes supplied, he argues, the essential discursive framework within which 
the concept of witchcraft made sense. Moreover, he shows how this framework pervaded a 
variety of subjects - language, science, history, religion and politics - that collectively shaped 
attitudes to witches. This stress on the need to examine a holistic ‘system of thought’ offers a 
rigorous and satisfying explanation for the construction of a prejudice, though whether the 
binary mentality that he identified ended with the Enlightenment and hence coincided with 
the end of witchhunts seems unconvincing. Indeed, a binary mentality clearly endured well 
beyond the end of the witch craze, as will become apparent in part three. 
Binary oppositions in religious polemic have proved a particularly rich source for historians, 
because of the crisis created by the protestant and catholic reformations in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries. Protestant demonization of the catholic other, and catholic or moderate 
protestant hatred of protestant zealotry produced in Britain the powerful and enduring 
prejudices of ‘anti-popery’ and ‘anti-puritanism’. Peter Lake, in an influential article 
examining the ‘construction of a prejudice’, suggested that ‘anti-popery’ (that is to say, 
hostility not just to the catholic church but also to the political and cultural authority it 
wielded) was a complex entity, made up of different strands of argument and narrative. The 
various elements could be combined by different individuals and groups into different 
versions of ‘popery’, thereby constructing different versions of the groups defining 
themselves against it. Thus ‘anti-popery’ and ‘anti-puritanism’, Lake argued, were enduring 
but not fixed stereotypes: aspects that were central to one polemical moment or group identity 
might, in different circumstances, or in the hands of other polemicists, become peripheral. 
‘We are not dealing with coherent ideological positions, but rather with constellations of 
ideas, attributes and narratives, which could be arranged into a number of differently 
inflected syntheses, to meet a variety of polemical circumstances and forward a range of 
often very different, indeed sometimes mutually exclusive political purposes’.33 Such a view 
makes a stereotype a highly fluid, contingent entity, constituted by many different parts each 
of which might be stressed at any one time, depending on the context, with the result that the 
stereotype could and did change over time.34 In short, Lake argues, the stereotype has a 
history, an argument entirely compatible with, and reinforcing of, the conclusions of social 
psychologists Billig, Potter and Wetherell. 
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34 Lake does not, however, see the stereotype as full of agency, creating what it sought to 
attack, although another eminent historian of the reformation, Patrick Collinson, clearly did: 
for Collinson anti-puritanism helped to create Puritanism. For Collinson, understanding the 
stereotype is essential to understanding the past, since stereotypes were not simply a 
reflection of antipathies but helped to constitute them. 
The role of polemic in the construction of anti-popery and anti-puritanism highlights the 
importance of the new technology of the printing press in the construction, articulation and 
absorption of stereotypes but there is relatively little agreement amongst historians about how 
far the press fabricated stereotypes. For many historians of the pre-modern period oral and 
manuscript cultures were as important in shaping popular attitudes, and oral, print and scribal 
cultures worked symbiotically rather than in tension with one another.35 Stereotypes were 
thus created through conversation as well as through the media that represented or replicated 
it. For other historians, however, the print revolution, with its capacity to reproduce the same 
text more extensively, penetrated all social levels and provided a shared set of cultural 
attitudes.36 
Historians, when invoking the term ‘stereotype’, have thus made use of a variety of notions 
and approaches: an imagined community, ‘Othering’, binary mentalities, the manipulability 
and mutability of stereotypes for polemical purposes, the nature of print, the role of 
conversation and the power of words. These approaches in some way overlap with or touch 
on those adopted by psychologists. ‘Othering’ and ‘out groups’, or ‘imagined communities’ 
and ‘social representations’ are not too dissimilar and there is a common interest in binaries 
and the role of the media. Similarly, the capacity of words to shape cognitionis recognised in 
both the social psychology literature and the historical-literary works that investigate 
rhetorical practices. To be sure, there are interesting differences. Abric’s stable core and 
changeable periphery, for example, has something in common with Lake’s notion of 
constellations of attributes that could be arranged and rearranged to stress different elements, 
but Lake’s model has a far less stable, and more manipulable, core than Abric allows for. Yet 
it is clear that historians and social psychologists are often pursuing similar problems from 
slightly different perspectives and that historical work (both in terms of approach and data) 
might greatly enrich the perspective of the currently very present-centred psychologist. 
III 
This final section will attempt to bring together some of the historical and psychological 
approaches in order to examine stereotypes that are part of a polemical battle. Building on the 
linguistic approach taken by both sets of secondary literature, I will show how rival groups 
sought to ‘capture’ key terms and attributes in order to win popular support. The analysis 
aims to offer a dynamic, contested and even dialectical explanation for how stereotypes 
evolve.  In this version, alternative and competing visions of particular groups struggled for 
the control of the stereotype, in order to achieve positive rather than negative associations. 
                                                          
35 A. Fox, Oral and Literate Culture in England 1500-1700 (Oxford, 2000); A. Fox and D. 
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and the Law in Early Modern England (Basingstoke, 2009), a volume that examines the 
‘media panic’ model advocated by Stanley Cohen. 
They did this by trying to wrest from opponents the usage of a positively charged word or 
attribute to attach to their cause; or by trying to attach a negatively charged word to their 
opponents’ identity. The two sides engaged in a contest with each other, so that there were 
different constructions of the same phenomenon, even at the same time. These different 
constructions were necessarily closely related to one another: the positive and negative 
stereotypes were two different representations of the same phenomenon that were fought over 
in a struggle that itself shaped how the two sides interacted. The stereotyping process was 
thus dialogic, as the two groups responded to each other’s interventions.  
The section also seeks to make methodological points about the importance of images in the 
process of stereotyping. Lippmann’s ‘pictures in the mind’ can be taken more literally than he 
perhaps intended, for images can embody stereotypical attributes, not least because they 
could also contain or echo the linguistic construction of the stereotype. The pre-modern mind, 
like the modern one, was also conditioned to thinking visually. Even if Protestantism was 
distrustful of religious imagery, the Renaissance ‘emblem’ was an ubiquitous genre, 
combining an instructive image of a concept or keyword with a set of verse that explained the 
image’s iconography. The ‘emblem’ was still in use at the beginning of the eighteenth 
century and continued to influence the representation of concepts. Increasingly, however, a 
new form, the graphic satire, was becoming a useful vehicle for the visual manipulation of 
stereotypes. Initially these graphic satires emulated the emblem, with titles, images and texts; 
but increasingly the explanatory text became minimised or embedded within the image itself. 
By the late eighteenth century, such images were a common part of polemical battles and 
provide a rich source for the study of stereotypes.37 Fortunately, the superb British Museum 
website, which contains most of the extensive collection of prints and drawings, is searchable 
by keyword, so that such analyses are possible.38 Even if visual material is not as well 
catalogued as the printed word, we still have enough to show the merits of using such 
material. In other words, a study of stereotypes offers a way not only of bringing history and 
social psychology together but also of uniting them with other disciplines, such as art history 
but also sociology, media studies and literary criticism.39 Such a multi-disciplinary approach, 
it is hoped, will not only be of appeal to a wide audience but also show the large degree of 
common ground between the disciplines, as well as the gaps and differences between them. 
I shall illustrate these points through an analysis of images of ‘reform’ and reformers in the 
late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. ‘Reform’ became an important term in the 
second half of the eighteenth century, though it continued to resonate with the legacy of 
‘reformation’ that had been used to describe the religious changes of the sixteenth and 
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seventeenth centuries.40 The term ‘reform’ increasingly became associated with 
parliamentary reform, though it could also embrace other forms too (such as ‘economical 
reform’ which meant the state’s, especially the Crown’s, financial and patronage structures 
and influence). Reform was a wide-reaching but also a disturbing and divisive process 
because it raised so many questions about what line of reform to take and how best to pursue 
it. Reform was thus a polarising process that encouraged binary representations to depict 
advocates as either good or bad. Reform and reformers were endowed by sympathisers and 
critics with very different characteristics: the stereotype of the reformer was contested. My 
concern here is less with the history of reform and more with how it can shed light on 
stereotyping processes.  
Anti-reform graphic satire was common in the 1790s, when opponents of reform sought to 
associate it with what they saw as the horrors of the French revolution. In other words, this 
was one of those ‘moments of crisis’ that so often produced and hardened stereotypes. Such 
images also often associate reform with the controversial politician and leader of the Whig 
party, Charles James Fox, who often voiced critiques of the existing system and whose 
distinctive face and perceived vices became associated with the reformer. An individual was 
therefore used to epitomise the group and to make the threat posed by the group seem real - 
here the stereotype was less of a group than of a particular individual who was made to 
symbolise the group, thereby enabling the group to be tainted with his alleged vices. The 
negative depiction of reform also involved embedding the word in a network of associated 
terms, each of which had its own set of associations and histories. Very often, as the 
following section makes clear, these terms were the abstractions noted by proponents of the 
Linguistic Category Model discussed earlier. Thus although reform was tied closely to the 
Fox and his vices, the stereotype was universalised through the suggestion that the abstract 
traits depicted in the images, by means of key words or labels, were shared ones among other 
reformers. We can also discern rhetorical ways of thinking and arguing being invoked, with 
the articulation of counter-arguments within these prints and a flexibility in how the 
stereotype came to be used. 
These points can be illustrated by analysis of the images themselves.  
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 Figure 1: James Gillray, The Tree of Liberty (1798) 
 
Figure 1 depicts Fox as the devilish serpent tempting John Bull with a maggoty apple labelled 
‘reform’. Other diseased apples on the wizened tree (which is labelled ‘Opposition’, and 
shown as having roots of ‘ambition’, ‘envy’ and ‘disappointment’, suggesting that personal 
slights rather than principle were the principal drivers of the reformist cause) construct a 
network of abstract, associated pejorative terms: ‘slavery’, ‘atheism’, ‘blasphemy’, 
‘democracy’, ‘plunder’, ‘revolution’, ‘Whig club’, ‘deism’, ‘impiety’, ‘conspiracy’. In the 
background, by contrast, is a flourishing tree, with a trunk of ‘justice’, with branches of ‘law’ 
and ‘religion’, with a crown in its leaves and healthy apples labelled with very positive 
abstractions: ‘happiness’, ‘security’ and ‘freedom’. John Bull, in the foreground, collects the 
sound applies, indicating, should the viewer be in any doubt, which tree bore the best fruit, a 
message also driven home by the title, which reinforces the association between reform and 
the undermining of ‘liberty’.  
The image thus works with a binary divide: reform is associated with a list of negatively 
charged terms, whilst the healthy tree in the background suggests that the status quo, in terms 
of the law, crown and church, led to a flourishing state.41 The negatively charged, abstract 
terms occur frequently in other images, often in the same grouping, suggesting a shared set of 
associations. Thus many of the image’s anti-reform ‘hot words’ relate to irreligion - 
‘atheism’, ‘blasphemy’, ‘impiety’ and ‘deism’ (the belief in a non-Christian God) -  and were 
contrasted with the flourishing ‘religion’ in the background. In late eighteenth century Britain 
religious feelings were particularly emotive: the old hostility against puritans and dissenters 
(those who challenged the established Church of England) had plenty of vigour, reanimated 
both by attempts to reform the church and by the French Revolution’s attack on orthodox 
Christianity. A parallel image by a different artist, Thomas Rowlandson, strikingly echoes the 
network of terms used by Gillray and also widens it to include other associated terms:  
 
 
Fig 2: Thomas Rowlandson, The Contrast (1792).  
In figure 2, ‘French liberty’ is thus, as in the Gillray print, associated with ‘atheism’, and 
contrasted, in binary fashion (indeed, as though these are almost literally two sides of the 
same coin), with the ‘religion’ and ‘morality’ associated with ‘English liberty’. Similarly the 
‘plunder’ associated with reform in the Gillray images is echoed by the ‘national and private 
ruin’ in the Rowlandson image; and the pejorative ‘revolution’ in the Gillray is the theme of 
the Rowlandson print. It is interesting to note that all the positively charged terms used by 
Gillray - religion, law, justice, happiness - were also deployed by Rowlandson, suggesting a 
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tightly constructed network of positively charged, emotive abstractions. Here, then, was a 
‘core’ of attributes. Liberty, it seems from these images, does not need reform. 
The charged network of terms apparent in the Gillray satire is also reminiscent of a third 
image, by William Dent, showing Fox as a ‘democrat’ and also further widening the cluster 
of associated terms: 
 
Fig. 3. William Dent, A Right Hon. Democrat Dissected (1793) 
Figure 3 makes use of the terms ‘envy’ and ‘ingratitude’, which had formed the roots of 
Gillray’s diseased tree, as labels for Fox’s ribs (as do ‘madness’, ‘treachery’ and ‘cruelty’ 
which feature in the Rowlandson’s depiction of revolutionary liberty), and his right arm 
carries the maxim ‘Advocate for Atheists, Jews, Papists and Dissenters’, reinforcing the 
association with those who were thought to attack the Church of England. ‘Religion’, 
‘liberty’, ‘property’, ‘law’ and ‘morality’ are again being crushed under Fox’s feet. The 
image also suggests (as rhetoric taught and as many other stereotypes did), that Fox’s 
external persona hid a conspiratorial inner one. Asch and Zukier argue that people distinguish 
between an inner and outer person, in order to resolve inconsistencies - thus a person might 
exhibit a trait on the outside but the perceivers might conclude it did not reflect the true, inner 
person, and hence there was no need to change their mental stereotype. 42 Hence ‘hypocrisy’ 
labelled clearly on Fox’s knee. 
One powerful means of creating a sense of a stereotypical in-group against reform was the 
use of Britannia (seen in figure 2) and John Bull (in figure 1).  The representation of 
Britannia as a beautiful virgin seated on a rock with shield and spear first appeared on a coin 
in 1672, when Britain was threatened by Dutch power. The ravishing of Britannia in figure 4 
by a skeleton of death wearing only a cloak of ‘radical reform’ (the pejorative adjective 
further charging the word), despite her shield of ‘religion’ and a fiery sword of ‘the laws’, 
was clearly another means of invoking the props of ‘British liberty’ depicted in figure 2. The 
French cap of liberty, given such prominence in figure 1 as a sign of the excessive and 
foreign notion of liberty associated with reform, is again apparent on the figure of death in 
figure 4. Similarly, figure 1 used the figure of John Bull, much to the same effect. John Bull 
was the stereotype invented at the beginning of the eighteenth century in order to symbolise 
British national identity and common sense.43 John Bull’s resistance of French liberty/reform 
is clear. 
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Figure 4: BM Satires 13279 George Cruickshank, Death or Liberty! Or Britannia & the 
virtues of the constitution in danger of violation from the gr[ea]t political libertinem radical 
reform! (1819) [cf. A second sight view of the blessings of radical reform BM Satires 11328]. 
In these images, then, we have a tight network of associated terms, both positively and 
negatively charged, that shape the way in which a bundle of concepts - reform, liberty, 
Britishness - were represented both linguistically and visually. Yet the core sets of values 
were not stable and could be appropriated, even by reformers. Reformers contested the notion 
that their cause meant revolution and a threat to property, law, justice and religion. Indeed, 
they suggested that without reform these good things were threatened. Thus the positively 
charged associations were appropriated by the reformers from their critics. This process can 
be demonstrated in more detail through another set of images.  
 
Fig. 5 The reformers' attack on the old rotten tree (1831) 
In figure 5 the image of the diseased tree (powerfully deployed against reform in figure 1) is 
now used to represent the rotten parliamentary boroughs that created an unjust political 
system in which ‘cormorants’ nested - a bird associated for several centuries with greed and 
corruption. As with figure 1, a binary ‘good’ is depicted in the background, showing 
‘Constitution Hill’, the monarchy and John Bull bathed in sunlight. Bull’s reconfiguration as 
a supporter of reform underlines how figure 5 inverts figure 1’s message by recruiting the 
positively charged Bull to its cause. In the foreground the axe of ‘reform’ is wielded against 
the rotten tree.44 Reform could thus be depicted as loyal and pro-monarchy, and hence as the 
means to secure law and peace.  
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Fig 6 Charles Jameson Grant, The managers last kick (c.1830-5) BM Satires 17342 
 
Figure 6 shows King William IV riding ‘the good old Grey’ (an allusion to the reformist Earl 
Grey), with ‘reform’ exhaling from the horse’s mouth, and the ground on which they stand is 
‘Magna Charter’, the embodiment of the legal tradition. Whereas in the 1790s reform was 
stereotyped as a threat to law and the monarchy, by the 1830s those who opposed reform 
were now stereotyped in the same way. What had previously been depicted as French and 
anti-patriotic, could now be represented as British and patriotic. This is a point forcibly made 
by an image of Britannia with a banner of reform:  
 
Fig 7 Anon print of 1831 [BM Satires 16924] 
Indeed the symbolism of figure 7, with Britannia, the ship of state and the British lion, is 
almost the exact reverse of earlier anti-reform images such as figure 2, with reform now 
associated with the positive attributes depicted there.  
Conclusion 
The first two sections of this chapter examined ways in which social psychology might be 
useful to history, and how history might in turn be useful to social psychology. The third 
section offered a case study that sought to bring these two perspectives together.  
 
The evidence presented in the case study supports many of the findings made by social 
psychologists about the nature of in-groups and out-groups, about the persistence of binaries 
as a way of thinking, about the importance of the media in constructing and disseminating 
stereotypes, and about the importance of networks of abstract, highly charged and emotive 
terms. But it also modifies and challenges some conclusions. First, the role played in 
stereotypes by ‘state’ verbs - that describe states of being - might be extended to include 
charged abstract concepts or keywords such as ‘liberty’, ‘happiness’, ‘prosperity’ and 
‘religion’. Verbs were thus only part of a much wider linguistic framework that helped to 
construct, maintain and change stereotypes. Recovering how such keywords worked in 
relation to stereotypes is thus a fertile area for research, one which can (and perhaps can only) 
be explored in an interdisciplinary fashion. Secondly, the notion that stereotypes have a fixed, 
unchanging ‘core’ with a periphery that is more responsive to context may hold true for some 
stereotypes - and it may be that gender and race are less subject to change - but others are 
more fluid and malleable, manipulable by groups that sought to wrest control of key 
concepts, symbols and terms.45  
 
Above all, the diverging representations of reform suggest that stereotypes could be, and 
were, contested in polemical battles in which both sides sought to appropriate key attributes 
and symbols for their own side. In other words, stereotypes were not so much fixed as part of 
a moving battle, in which very different constructions could be pitted against one another and 
in which groups could appropriate attributes from each other. The findings of the case study 
of ‘reform’ support Lake’s suggestion, supported by Billig,that stereotypes were complex 
entities with histories that are worth charting, that they are both historical (being clearly 
pervasive well before the advent of modern mass society) and have histories that change over 
time. It would, of course, be interesting to know more about the particular terms and symbols 
that helped to constitute them, since these also clearly had histories of their own. Some of the 
attributes associated with the reform controversy had short histories - ‘radical’, in its modern 
sense of seeking to overturn the established order, for example, was an eighteenth century 
term- but others, such as ‘corruption’ or ‘liberty’, reached far back in time and even to 
different contexts. We might also chart histories of the vices and virtues that played such a 
prominent role in stereotype construction. In other words, there is a historical legacy of 
charged words, concepts and symbols that it would be useful to reconstruct.  
 
It may of course be that polemical battles between two groups, both of which had access to 
print media, resulted in slightly unusual types of stereotype. More often, it might be said, 
stereotypes reflect a dominant majority demonising and exercising power over a minority. 
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There is something to be said for that view. On the other hand, the reformers who in the 
1790s were very much in a minority managed over time to build a majority and reform was 
enacted in 1832. The changes in the stereotype of reformers might therefore have a wider 
resonance. Not only do they highlight the importance of a historical view of the evolution of 
a stereotype, they also indicate the degree to which stereotypes can be contested and 
challenged, even by out-groups, and that, when successful, this process involves the 
reconfiguration and appropriation of networks of attributes. Control of context-dependent key 
terms, traits and symbols is, history suggests, contestable.  
This chapter has sought to highlight the importance of analysing stereotypes historically and 
the advantages that might exist were social psychologists to do so more systematically than 
they have done so far. Similarly, historians might do more to problematise how far cognitive 
processes changed over time, acknowledge stereotyping as a normal rather than aberrant or 
irrational process, and also be more sensitive to how different types of language shaped the 
mental pictures created by them (an issue that should also draw in expertise from linguists as 
well and offers an area of common concern across the disciplines). Given shared interests in 
the public sphere, the arts of persuasion and the formation of attitudes, historians might also 
explore the social psychology literature on these themes in order to distinguish between fixed 
or durable social phenomena and those subject to historical context, an enterprise that could 
harness the energies of both groups of scholars.  
